Where is this New Moral Theology leading us? Archbishop Fernandez explains in a commentary on Amoris Laetitia
After several months of intense
activity by the factions opposed to the novelties of Chapter VII of Amoris
laetitia – minority but hyperactive – or strong attempts to conceal them, the
war seems to have come to a standstill. We
must now pause to recognize what Francis left us concretely as an irreversible
novelty.
THERE ARE NO OTHER POSSIBLE
INTERPRETATIONS.
If what interests us is how the Pope himself
interprets what he wrote, the answer is very explicit in his commentary on the
orientations of the bishops of the Buenos Aires region. After having spoken of the possibility for
divorcees in new union to live in continence, they say that "in other more
complex circumstances, and when a declaration of nullity could not be obtained,
the option mentioned can in fact not be feasible”. They add that “a path of discernment is
however also possible. If we recognize
that, in a specific case, there are limitations which attenuate responsibility
and guilt (cf. 301-302), in particular when a person considers that they would
fall into a new fault by injuring the children of the new union, Amoris
laetitia opens up the possibility of accessing the sacraments of Reconciliation
and the Eucharist (cf. notes 336 and 351)”.
[2] Francis immediately sent them a formal letter saying that "the
writing is very good and fully explains the meaning of Chapter VIII". But it is important to note that he adds:
“There are no other interpretations” (letter of 05/09/2016). [3]There is therefore no point in waiting for
another response from the Pope. The
orientations as well as the letter of the Pope were published in the Acta
Apostolicae Sedis [4], associated with a rescript declaring them “authentic Magisterium”.
Consequently, there is no longer any
room for public debate and only enforcement is possible. One wonders if the Pope clarifies his
interpretation in a letter to a group of Bishops. But in fact, it happened on other occasions. To give an example, let us recall an incident
concerning the interpretation of the First Vatican Council. The German bishops responded to Chancellor Bismarck,
who argued that a Roman centralism had been defined which weakened Episcopal
authority. By their response, they
rejected this interpretation of the Council. Pope Pius IX approved the interpretation of these bishops by a letter
(03/12/1875) and by the audience of 03/15/1875 (DH 3112-3117). In a note to Lumen Gentium 27, Pope Pius IX's
letter to the German bishops is quoted, thus confirming his hermeneutical
authority. Obviously, a letter from the
Pope does not have the same value as an Encyclical, but, as we can see, it can
have great decisive practical importance in explaining the correct
interpretation of a text of greater value. If the Pope has received a unique charism in
the Church at the service of the correct interpretation of the divine Word –
the charism given to Peter to bind and loose and to confirm his brothers in the
Faith – this cannot exclude his capacity to interpret the documents he himself
wrote.
PERFECT CONTINENCE
The proposal of Pope Saint John
Paul II to divorced people in new unions to live together in perfect
continence, as a pre-condition for access to Eucharistic communion, was already
an important novelty. Many resisted this
measure. Even today, some do not accept
this proposal because they consider that it gives rise to relativism. On the other hand, there is a later novelty
in the language of Benedict XVI. While Pope Saint John Paul II asked them to
“commit themselves to living in full continence” (FC 84), Pope Benedict XVI
proposed to them, more delicately, to “strive” to live “as friends” (SCar 29b). Pope Francis recognizes the possibility of
proposing perfect continence to divorcees in a new union but admits that there
may be difficulties in practicing it (cf. note 329). Note 364 allows the Sacrament of
reconciliation to be administered to them even when further falls are
foreseeable. Francis questions priests
who “demand from penitents an undisguised intention to make amends, so that
mercy is buried by the search for a supposedly pure justice” (ibid.). And there he takes up an important
affirmation of Saint John Paul II, who maintained that even the foreseeability
of a new fall “does not prejudge the authenticity of the intention”[5]. Contrary to this careful precision of Pope Saint
John Paul II, some seem to demand some kind of strict control over what people
do in private. We must warmly
congratulate those who manage to live in perfect continence, enriching in
various ways their common daily life. But
that does not mean ignoring the fact that others have serious difficulty
achieving it. When speaking of the need
to avoid scandal, it should be noted that scandal only occurs when people
"display" their situation as if it were correct (cf. 297). Otherwise, the scandal would also occur when
the first marriage was declared null, since the many people who see them go to Confession
and take communion would not be aware of this nullity. Besides, they would not know if they were
living like brothers and sisters or not.
Objective fault is not "manifest" insofar as it cannot be
confirmed from the outside, and each deserves the benefit of the doubt. Let us leave this question – in fact
unverifiable – to the intimacy of the discernment of the faithful with their
pastor. The great resistance that this
question arouses in certain groups indicates that this question, beyond its
importance in itself, breaks a rigid mental structure, very focused on
questions of sexuality, and obliges to broaden the perspectives. This is why Pope Francis asks pastors to help
the faithful “to assume the logic of compassion with fragile people and to
avoid persecutions or judgments that are too harsh or impatient” (308).
ABSOLUTE MORAL STANDARDS AND
HUMAN LIMITS
Amoris laetitia takes up a teaching of Saint
Thomas Aquinas on the application of general principles: “The more one goes
into details, the more the exceptions multiply” (304). Francis does not claim that general moral
laws cannot apply to all situations, nor that they are incapable of removing
the decision from conscience. On the
contrary, he affirms that they “present a good that should never be neglected
or misunderstood”. However, “in their
formulation, they cannot absolutely cover all particular situations” (ibid.). It is the wording of the rule that cannot
cover everything, not the rule itself. And
this is true not only for positive laws, but even for our way of formulating
natural law in its various expressions. The
International Theological Commission, under the pontificate of Pope Benedict
XVI, expressed itself in these terms: "Natural law should not be presented
as a set of ready-made rules imposed a priori on the moral subject, but rather
as a source of objective inspiration for his eminently personal decision-making
process”.[6] The absolute rule itself admits of no exceptions but this does not
mean that its brief formulation should be applied in every sense and without
nuance to every situation. “Do not kill” admits of no exceptions. However, it does leave room for the question:
should the taking of life in self-defence be included in the expression
"killing" prohibited by the norm?
Should taking someone else's food to feed a starving child be included
in the term "theft" prohibited by the norm? No one doubts that it is legitimate to ask
whether these specific cases are really included in the limited formulations of
the negative precepts "not to kill" or "not to steal". For the same reason, it is also legitimate to
ask whether acts of cohabitation more uxorio should always fall, in their
proper sense, under the negative precept prohibiting "fornication". I say "in the proper sense" because
it is not possible to maintain that these acts are, in all cases, seriously
disordered in the subjective sense. It
is in the complexity of particular situations that, as Saint Thomas would say,
"indeterminacy increases". Indeed,
it is not easy to treat as "adulterous" a woman who has been beaten
and despised by her Catholic husband and who has obtained refuge and economic
and psychological help from another man who has helped her bring up the
children from her previous union, with whom she has had new children and with
whom she has lived for several years. The
question is not whether this woman does not know that living with this man does
not meet objective moral standards. It
is more than that. Some people try to
simplify the question by saying that, according to Francis, "the subject
may not be in mortal sin because, for various reasons, he is not aware that his
situation is adultery"[7] And they question him on the fact that it makes
no sense to speak of discernment if "the subject remains, indefinitely,
unaware of his situation". [8] But
Francis explicitly said that "the limits do not only concern a possible
ignorance of the norm" (301). The
question is much more complex and involves at least two fundamental
considerations. Firstly, whether a woman
who is aware of the existence of the norm can really understand that not
abandoning this man - from whom she cannot demand total and permanent continence
for the time being - is really a very serious fault against God's will. Secondly, if she can really, at that moment,
take the decision to abandon this man. This
is where the limited wording of the norm is unable to express everything. In any case, Francis' specific and principal
proposal, in line with the Synod, does not appear in the considerations on the
formulation of the norm. So why is this
question part of his approach? Because
he calls for great caution in the language used to describe fragile people. For him, offensive expressions such as
"adulterer" or "fornicator" do not necessarily have to be
deduced from general rules when they refer to concrete people. Rather, the emphasis is on the question of
the possible reduction of responsibility and guilt. Conditionalities can reduce or cancel
responsibility and guilt in the face of any norm, even in the face of negative
precepts and absolute moral norms. This
ensures that the life of sanctifying grace is not always lost in a "more
uxorio" cohabitation.
WHEN IT'S IMPOSSIBLE
Pope Francis considers that, even
knowing the norm, a person "may find himself in specific conditions that
do not allow him to act differently and to take other decisions without further
fault. As the Synod Fathers rightly
said, there may be factors that limit a person's ability to decide" (301). He speaks of subjects who "are not able
fully to understand, appreciate or practise the objective requirements of the
law" (295). In another paragraph,
he reaffirms: "In certain circumstances, people find it very difficult to
act differently" (302). He also
recalls that Saint John Paul II recognised that, in certain cases, "a man
and a woman, for serious reasons, such as the education of children, cannot
fulfil the obligation of separation" (FC 84; AL 298). It should be noted that Saint John Paul II
recognised that "they cannot".
Benedict XVI was even clearer when he said that in certain cases
"there are objective conditions that make cohabitation de facto
irreversible" (SCar 29b). This
becomes particularly complex, for example, when the man is not a practising
Catholic. The woman is not in a position
to force a person who does not share all her Catholic convictions to live in
perfect continence. In this case, it is
not easy for an honest and pious woman to take the decision to abandon the man
she loves, who has protected her from a violent husband and saved her from
falling into prostitution or suicide. The
"serious motives" mentioned by Pope Saint John Paul II, or the
"objective conditions" indicated by Pope Benedict XVI, are increased. But what is particularly noteworthy is that
by abandoning this man, she would be leaving the young children of the new
union without a father and without a family environment. There is no doubt that, in this case, the
capacity to decide on sexual continence presents, at least for the time being,
serious conditions that diminish culpability and imputability. Great caution must therefore be exercised
when making judgements solely on the basis of a general rule. Pope Francis is thinking in particular of
"the situation of families overwhelmed by poverty, affected in many ways,
where the constraints of life are experienced in a heartbreaking way (AL 49). When dealing with these families, we must
avoid "imposing on them a series of norms as if they were a rock, with the
effect that these people feel judged and abandoned" (ibid.).
BEYOND “SITUATIONISM”
The Pope, faithful to the real
and limited possibilities opened up by the Synod - and even against the
proposals of progressive moralists - preferred to maintain the distinction
between objective sin and subjective fault.
Thus, even if it can be clearly and forcefully argued that the sexual
relations of divorcees in a new union constitute an objective situation of
habitual grave sin, this does not imply that there is necessarily grave sin in
the subjective sense, i.e. a grave fault that deprives the life of sanctifying
grace: "The Church has a solid reflection on conditionings and extenuating
circumstances. It is therefore no longer
possible to say that all those who find themselves in any situation known as
'irregular' are living in a situation of mortal sin, deprived of sanctifying
grace" (301). It is already widely
accepted - even in the Catechism - that "the imputability and
responsibility of an action can be diminished or even eliminated because of
ignorance, inadvertence, violence, fear, habits, disordered affections and
other psychological or social factors" (CCC 1735). For Pope Francis, however, it is not specific
circumstances that determine objective morality. The fact that conditioning can reduce guilt
does not mean that what is objectively bad becomes objectively good. We need only read the following sentence:
"Because of conditioning or extenuating circumstances, it is possible
that, in the midst of an objective situation of sin - which is not subjectively
imputable or is not fully imputable - it is possible to live in the grace of
God" (305). In other words, it is
always a question of an "objective situation of sin", because there
is always a clear evangelical proposal on marriage, and this concrete situation
does not reflect it objectively. Francis,
like the Synod, supports the existence of objective truths and universal norms,
and has never advocated subjectivism or relativism. God's plan is marriage understood as an
indissoluble union, and this point was not called into question either at the
Synod or during his pontificate.
THE POWER OF DISCERNMENT
On the other hand, Pope Francis
never said that anyone can receive communion if they are not in God's grace. But, as we have just seen, it is not always
enough for there to be a serious objective fault for someone to be deprived of
sanctifying grace. There can therefore
be a path of discernment open to the possibility of receiving the nourishment
of the Eucharist. This is only possible
if we accept a different way of looking at the consequences of the norm. This does not admit exceptions in terms of
objective qualification on the basis of an absolute moral precept. But it does allow for discernment in terms of
its disciplinary derogations. Although
the norm is universal, nevertheless, "since the degree of responsibility
is not the same in all cases, the consequences or effects of a norm need not
always be the same" (AL 300)." Nor with regard to sacramental
discipline, since discernment can recognise that, in a particular situation,
there is no serious fault" (note 336).
The question arises: can this be discerned in pastoral dialogue? The Pope says yes, and this paves the way for
a change in discipline. The great
innovation of Pope Francis is to admit that a pastoral discernment in the
sphere of the "internal forum" can have practical consequences on the
way discipline is applied. The general
canonical norm is maintained (cf. 300), although it may not be applied in
certain cases because of a process of discernment. In this discernment, the individual person's
awareness of his or her real situation before God, of his or her real
possibilities and limitations, plays a central role. This awareness, accompanied by a pastor and
enlightened by the Church's guidelines, is capable of an evaluation that gives
rise to a judgement sufficient to discern the possibility of entering communion. Does this imply that we can pass judgement on
our own state of grace? Pope Saint John
Paul II stated that "the judgement on the state of grace obviously belongs
to the person concerned alone, since it is a judgement of conscience"[9]
But it must be made clear that this is only a certain moral certainty, the only
one that someone can attain before approaching communion. It is never a certainty, even if you are not
aware that you have violated a commandment.
The Council of Trent defined that, looking at ourselves, we cannot be
certain of our state of grace (cf. S. VI, ch. 9). We are talking here about the minimum
"moral certainty" that a person can attain after a process of
personal and pastoral discernment, which must not be based solely on a single
general norm. Until now, the discernment
of mitigated guilt has not made it possible to envisage consequences in the
external or disciplinary sphere. The
disciplinary consequences of the norm remain unchanged because they are based
solely on an objective fault that is contrary to an absolute norm. François proposes to go a little further. It is true that the general norm is not a
pure discipline, but that it is linked to a theological truth, such as the
union between Christ and the Church reflected in marriage. But sometimes "excessive conclusions are
drawn from certain theological reflections" (AL 2) when they are
translated into a rigid discipline that admits of no discernment. This is where Francis makes a change from his
previous praxis.
THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHANGE OF DISCIPLINE
Is this change possible and
acceptable? Can Pope Francis take up the
teaching of Pope Saint John Paul II while opening a door that was closed? Yes, because a change in the Church's
understanding of its own doctrine and its disciplinary consequences is possible. Let us look at a few historical examples. In 1832, Pope Gregory XVI, in Mirari Vos,
declared that it is an "absurd and erroneous judgement, or rather a
delusion, that freedom of conscience should be admitted and guaranteed to
anyone" (MV 15). In the Syllabus of
Pius IX (1864), religious freedom was condemned as one of the main
"errors". But in the following
century, the Second Vatican Council substantially modified these strong ideas
(cf. DH 2-3). A similar evolution
occurred on the question of the possibility of salvation outside the Catholic
Church. Pope Nicholas V authorised the
King of Portugal to take slaves. This
was later re-affirmed in the Bull Romanus Pontifex (10.13) of 1455[10]. And it is not a secondary question since it
concerns the inalienable dignity of the human person. 11] Since these changes in the understanding
of doctrine, there have been corresponding changes in discipline. However, some argue that these comparisons
are not convincing, and insist that any changes must be in line with what the Church
has previously said. This would be a
kind of Magisterial "fixism". But,
precisely in the examples mentioned, we can see that evolution has not taken
place "in the same direction" as what was said before, at least not
on the question itself. Between admitting
slavery and not admitting it anyway, there is an immense evolution. Continuity only exists in the general
doctrine on human dignity, but not on the specific point in question, where the
Church has really evolved in its understanding.
Similarly, between affirming that only a Catholic can be saved and
maintaining that there is a possibility of salvation outside the Church, there
is no continuity with regard to the question itself. It is clear that the Church is growing in a
better understanding of the Gospel proposition, in a more complete vision and
in new ways of applying what is taught. But
some find it very hard to accept that such a thing can happen in the area of
sexuality.
RECENT CHANGES IN THE DISCIPLINE
OF NEW UNIONS
The fact is that, even in
practice concerning the disciplinary treatment of divorced persons in new
unions, there have already been significant changes over the last century. Let us remember that, using the same
arguments as those invoked to refuse them Communion, in other times "the
prohibition of funerals and of all public funeral services" was also
applied to them. [12] This has changed,
without all the convictions underlying this practice falling away. On the basis of certain reasons that still
exist, a discipline was applied that is not maintained today. This indicates the possibility of changes in
disciplinary practice that do not necessarily overturn the great convictions
that underpinned the previous praxis, but that consider in another way the
possible practical consequences of the general norm. Amoris laetitia gives rise to a new change,
which does not imply a contradiction with previous teaching, but rather a
harmonious evolution and creative continuity.
The famous philosopher - and specialist in the thought of Pope Saint
John Paul II - Rocco Buttiglione explained it very well: "John Paul II in
no way wants to cancel out the role of subjective conscience. The objective side of the action decides on
the goodness and seriousness of the act.
The subjective side of the action decides the level of responsibility of
the agent [...] Pope Francis does not place himself in the field of
justification of the act, but of subjective mitigating circumstances that
reduce the responsibility of the agent. This
is precisely the balance of Catholic ethics and it is what distinguishes the
realist ethics of Saint John Paul II from the objectivist ethics of some of
Francis' opponents [...] Familiaris consortio, on the other hand, when it
formulates the rule, tells us that it does not tolerate exceptions for a
proportionate reason. The rule according
to which a person who is not in the grace of God must not receive the
Eucharist, by its very nature, does not tolerate exceptions. He who unworthily receives the body and blood
of Christ eats and drinks his own damnation.
The rule according to which persons in the grace of God are excluded
from communion as a canonical penalty for the anti-testimony they have given,
on the other hand, can be the subject of exceptions, and this is what Amoris
laetitia says". [13] Buttiglione's
expression "because of the anti-testimony they have given" should be
clarified by saying: "because their situation does not objectively
correspond to the good proposed by the general norm".
RECOGNITION OF LIMITS AND THE
POSSIBLE GOOD
Once again, let us say that this
does not imply the lowering of an objective value. What Francis presents is the situation of a
person who, in dialogue with the pastor, does not present the intimate acts of
a more uxorio cohabitation as subjectively honest, that is, as the object of a
personal choice which legitimises them. She
only presents them as difficult to avoid in their concrete circumstances, even
if she sincerely wishes to grow at this stage.
Circumstances can reduce guilt, but they cannot transform an act that is
dishonest in its purpose into an act that is justified as a choice. Indeed, Amoris laetitia itself rejects the
attitude of someone who "exhibits objective sin as if it were part of the
Christian ideal" (297). It is
clear, then, that Francis does not accept that such an act can be justified as
a "personal choice". Amoris
laetitia refers to people who are aware of the seriousness of their situation,
but who have "great difficulty in turning back without consciously feeling
that they are falling into a new fault" (298). The fact that guilt is diminished, because
the capacity to decide is strongly conditioned, does not mean that their
situation should be presented as a personal project in conformity with the
Gospel. For this very reason, discernment
is not closed, but "is dynamic and must always remain open to new stages
of growth and to new decisions that make it possible to realise the ideal more
fully" (303). This is according to
an authentic understanding of the "law of graduality" (295), which invites
us to respond better and better to God, trusting in the help of his grace.
If the act remains objectively disordered
and does not lose its objective gravity, then it cannot be “chosen” with
conviction, as if it were part of the Christian ideal. It can even less be claimed that, through
this "choice of life", she becomes subjectively honest. It is quite another thing to propose, as
Francis does, that in a context of diminished guilt, one seeks to respond to
the will of God with greater dedication, which is possible in the context of
this situation. For example, with
greater generosity towards one's children, or with the decision to assume a
more intense commitment as a couple for the common good, or with a maturation
of family dialogue, or with the development of more frequent and mutual acts of
charity more intense, etc. These
attempts can indeed be the object of a “personal choice” and are examples of
this “possible good” which can be achieved within the limits of one’s own
situation (cf. EG 44-45; AL 308). They
are expressions of the “via caritatis”, to which “those who find it difficult
to fully live the divine law” (306) can always turn. In this way, the conscience is also called to
recognize "what, for the moment, is the generous response that one can
offer to God […] the gift of self that God himself calls for in the midst of
the concrete complexity limits” (303). It
is not that everything is the same, or that now “everything is equivalent”. The need not to mask the gravity of the
situation explains why the Pope sets certain firm limits in the discernment
proposed. For example, it excludes the
case of “a new union resulting from a recent divorce” or “the situation of
someone who has repeatedly failed in his family commitments” (298). At the same time, he asks that people be
guided in the sincere recognition of their own truth, especially with regard to
“the way they behaved towards their children” or towards the abandoned spouse
(cf. 300). There are limits that
discernment must not exceed, in particular when the recognition of the other is
at stake, or when one is still poorly informed about one's own situation. The Gospel is not diminished, let alone its
demands of charity, but is embodied in the concrete possibilities of human
complexity.
USE OF CONSCIENCE
In discussions around Amoris
laetitia, some argue that the pope attempts to empower people's consciences to create
truths and norms at will. With this argument, these opponents of Francis
try to force others to accept a certain logic, within which there is no way
out. The Gospel is thus subject to a
kind of theological and moral mathematics.
Once this mental structure is assumed, there is no other choice than to
accept all the logic and the consequences of this way of using reason. It is a death trap. This is not the logic that Francis proposes
to the pastors of this time (cf. 296.312).
Moreover, he rejects the claim of “those who dream of a monolithic
doctrine defended by all without nuance” (EG 40). He recognizes the value of reason in
reflecting on the Gospel and appreciates the dialogue between faith and reason. But this does not imply canonizing “a”
reason, a particular way of reasoning, a philosophy to which the Gospel and the
whole Church must submit. The Gospel is
not enclosed in a philosophy because "Christian moral preaching is not
Stoic ethics, it is more than asceticism, it is not a simple practical philosophy
or a catalogue of sins and mistakes” (EG 39).
If one absolutizes a certain way of using reason, only those who possess
this mental structure will be able to interpret the doctrine and the
Revelation, and they will place themselves even above the Pope. The supernatural vision of the Church and of
the Petrine ministry would thus be lost.
Someone called it “intellectual Pelagianism” because a certain reason
takes the place of the Gospel and the working of the Spirit in his Church. The Scriptures would only serve to illustrate
the logic of “this” reason, administered by an oligarchic group of ethicists. Be that as it may, let us remember what
Francis says about the importance of conscience, for example in the following
texts: "It costs us to leave room for the conscience of the faithful, who
often respond as best they can to the gospel in the midst of its limitations
and can develop their own discernment in situations where all patterns are
challenged". We are called to form
consciences, but not to pretend to substitute ourselves for them” (AL 37). “The conscience of persons must be better
integrated into the praxis of the Church in certain situations which do not
objectively realize our conception of marriage” (302). However, Francis does not indicate that the
conscience of each of the faithful must be left completely free to move. What he asks for is a process of discernment
accompanied by a pastor. It is a
“personal and pastoral” discernment (300), which also takes very seriously “the
teaching of the Church and the orientations of the bishop” (ibid.) and
presupposes a “well-formed” conscience. (302). It is not a consciousness that seeks to
create truth as it pleases, or to adapt it to its own desires. On the part of the pastor, "it never
involves hiding the light of the most complete ideal or offering less than what
Jesus offers to the human being" (307), nor "excessive respect in
proposing it (ibid.). Some priests may
be questioned if they tend to fall into irresponsible or hasty arbitration,
causing confusion. The Pope is not
unaware of these risks to be avoided (cf. 300).
Each local church will find the right balance through the experience,
dialogue and guidance of the bishop. François'
proposal is very demanding. It would be
easier or more comfortable to apply rules rigidly and universally, to pretend
that everything is "black and white" (305), or to start from a few
general convictions and draw immutable conclusions without taking into account
of the complexity of reality and the concrete lives of people. But such comfortable rigidity can be a
betrayal of the heart of the Gospel: “It is sometimes very difficult for us to
make room in the pastoral ministry for the unconditional love of God. We attach so many conditions to mercy that we
empty it of its concrete meaning and its real meaning, and this is the worst
way to water down the Gospel” (311).
A SECONDARY QUESTION
If the question of the possible
access to Communion for certain people divorced in second union caused a stir,
the Pope tried – without success – to ensure that this step was taken
discreetly. This is why, after having
developed the premises of this decision in the body of the document, the
admission to communion of those divorced in a second union has been explained
in footnotes. This attention is
explained by the fact that what Francis considers "central" are the
chapters of Amoris laetitia "devoted to love" (6), where he offers us
a beautiful task in order to stimulate "growth, consolidation and
deepening of married and family love” (89).
He asks us to carry out "above all a pastoral care of the bond, in
which elements are provided that help both to ripen love and to overcome
difficult times" (211), a pastoral care that stimulates communion,
generous devotion , bonds of tenderness and mutual belonging. Because, ultimately, "marital love is
not first cured by speaking of indissolubility as an obligation, or by
repeating a doctrine, but by strengthening it through growth under the impulse
of grace. (134). It would be very good if we could work more
intensely in this direction, in the face of a world obscured by a comfortable
and superficial individualism that weakens and destroys bonds.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES: BUTTIGLIONE, Rocco. L’Approccio
Antropologico di San Giovanni Paolo II e quello Pastorale di Papa Francesco (The
Anthropological Approach of St John Paul II and the Pastoral Approach of Pope
Francis) in :
http://www.lastampa.it/rw/Pub/Prod/PDF/Approccio%20di%20Giovanni%20Paolo%20II%20e%20
di%20Francesco.pdf
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FERNÁNDEZ, Víctor Manuel. El programa del Papa
Francisco. Où veut-il nous emmener ? – The Programme of Pope Francis. Where does he want to take us? Buenos
Aires: San Pablo, 2014. GATTI, Guido. Ética cristiana y educación moral. Madrid : CCS, 1988.
RAUSCH, Thomas. La dottrina al
servizio della missione pastorale della Chiesa. La Civiltà Cattolica, v. 3981 (14 mai ; 2016) ; p. 223-236. English version- Doctrine at the service of
the Church's pastoral mission. Teología, v.
122 (2017) ; p. 165-180.
SCANNONE, Juan Carlos. Discerner et
accompagner dans une attitude théologique de la miséricorde. Réflexions sur l’exhortation
apostolique Amoris laetitia- Discerning and accompanying in a theological attitude of mercy. Reflections on the apostolic exhortation
Amoris laetitia Stromata, v. 72 (2016) ; pp. 1-12.
SPADARO, Antonio. Conversazione con il Cardinale
Schönborn sull « Amoris laetitia »- Conversation with Cardinal
Schönborn on "Amoris laetitia”. La Civiltà Cattolica,
v. 3986 (14 mai ; 2016) ; p. 130-152.
Biography
Bishop Víctor Manuel Fernández was born in Argentina in 1962. Ordained a priest in 1985, he obtained a
licentiate in theology, specialising in biblical studies, from the Pontifical
Gregorian University in Rome, and a doctorate in theology from the Faculty of
Theology in Buenos Aires. He was parish
priest of Santa Teresita parish in Río Cuarto, Córdoba, from 1993 to 2000. He was founder and rector of the Institute
for the Formation of the Laity and formator of the seminary in the same city. Since August 2008, he has been Dean of the
Faculty of Theology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina and has
also been President of the Argentine Theological Society. He was then rector of the Pontifical Catholic
University of Argentina until 2018. In
May 2013 he was appointed archbishop and in June 2018 he became head of the
Archdiocese of La Plata. He took part in
the Latin American Bishops' Conference of Aparecida and helped to draft the
final document. He was a member of the
2014 and 2015 Synods of Bishops on the Family, where he was also a member of
the drafting teams. At the Holy See, he
is a member of the Pontifical Council for Culture. He has over 300 publications in various
languages.
[1] Version
révisée et corrigée de l’article publié dans la revue Medellin, aout 2017, avec
pour titre : » LE CHAPITRE VIII D’AMORIS LAETITIA : CE QUI RESTE
APRES LA TEMPETE- Revised and corrected version of the article published in the
magazine Medellin, August 2017, with the title: 'CHAPTER VIII OF AMORIS
LAETITIA: WHAT REMAINS AFTER THE STORM.
[2] Bishops of the Buenos Aires region "basic criteria for the
application of chapter VIII of Amoris Laetitia" 5 September 2016, point 6.
[3] Letter to Mgr Fenoy, official website of the Holy See.
[4] With the date of 5 September 2016
[5] Letter to Cardinal W.Baum, 22 03 1996, cited in the note.
[6] International Theological Commission: In search of a universal
ethic: a new perspective on natural law, Rome 2009. 59
[7] This is what Claudio Pierantoni said in a recent conference
that was highly critical of Amoris laetitia.
(Rome 22 04 2017)
[8] Ibid
[9] De gratiae statu ut patet iudicium
solum ad sigulos homines spectat cum de conscienciae aestimatione agatur EDE 37
b
[10] http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/publish/1455_325/Bula_Romanus_Pont_fex_del_Papa_
[11] On the subject of the
evolution of the understanding of doctrine, we can take into account the
examples presented in: RAUSCH Thomas la doctrine au service de la mission
pastorale de l’Eglise- Doctrine at the service of the pastoral mission of the
Church La Civiltà cattolica v ;3981 14 mai 2016 ppp 223-236
[12] Elizari Francisco pastorale des
divorcés- pastoral care for the divorced Madrid édition Paulinas 1980 Pages
31-32
[13] Buttiglione Rocco l’approche
anthropologique de Saint Jean-Paul II et la pastorale du pape François- the anthropological approach of Saint John Paul
II and the pastoral approach of Pope Francis in http://www.lastampa.it/rw/Pub/Prod/PDF/Approccio%20di%20Giovanni%20Paolo%20II%20e%20di%20Fran cesco.pdf
For balance, commentary from the Society of Saint Pius X
Where is the New Theology leading us? by Father Garrigou-Lagrange 1948
See here also for a devastating critique of the Fernandez School for Immorality
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